Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor? Support for Social Citizenship Rights in the United States and Europe by Oser, Jennifer & Hooghe, Marc
1 
 
Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor? Support for Social 
Citizenship Rights in the United States and Europe* 
Paper to be presented at the 
Conference on the U.S. Presidential Election of 2016: Domestic & International Aspects 
Herzliya, Interdisciplinary Center 
January 8-9, 2017 
 
Abstract  
This article investigates whether the commitment to social rights as integral to a well-
functioning democracy exists among Americans in comparison to their European 
counterparts. In our comparison of data from the European Social Survey (2012) with 
a special parallel module of the US Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (2014) 
the findings suggest that similar conceptions of ideal democracy are found on both sides 
of the Atlantic. Although Americans are less likely than Europeans to consider fighting 
poverty and reducing income inequality as important democratic ideals, the analysis 
shows that the US is not exceptional in the existence of a social rights conception of 
democracy. A distinct feature of US public opinion is that support for social rights is 
more strongly associated with a left-right divide than in Europe. The observed 
congruence between policy and public opinion in the US highlights the importance of 
investigating the direction of causality between both phenomena. 
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Introduction 
Across industrialized societies, the extent of social welfare provisions varies widely. 
Various typologies have been suggested to introduce a distinction between different 
types of welfare regimes, such as Esping-Andersen’s (1990) well-known but also 
contested distinction between liberal, corporatist-statist and social-democratic welfare 
states. These types differ not only in their scope and the effectiveness of welfare 
coverage, but also with regard to the institutions and organizations that are responsible 
for administering welfare state provisions (Scruggs & Allan, 2006). In this literature, 
the United States stands out among other highly industrialized countries as a prime 
example of a liberal welfare state. Partly as a result of the absence of leftist political 
parties, social expenditure levels remain low compared to other industrialized societies 
(Hicks & Swank, 1992). 
Data from the OECD (2016) show that public social expenditure in the United States 
amounts to 19.3% of GDP, which is remarkably lower than Germany (25.3%), Japan 
(23.1%), or the United Kingdom (21.5 %). With regard to the level of public social 
expenditure that is strictly comparable across countries, the United States clearly is in 
the lower half of the OECD rankings (OECD, 2016), even as a number of specific US 
government policies that contribute to social welfare have been aptly termed “invisible” 
(Mettler, 2011). The political debate on the Affordable Care Act also suggests that 
expanding social protection programs is a difficult endeavor in contemporary US 
politics (Corman & Levin, 2016; Jacobs & Skocpol, 2015; Obama, 2016). This kind of 
cross-national comparison inevitably raises the question of how to explain the 
reluctance of the US political system to develop a more comprehensive social security 
system as exists in other major OECD economies. While we know that there is a 
phenomenon of American exceptionalism with regard to social policy (Teles, 1998), 
the main question in this article is to assess whether there is also a form of 
exceptionalism as far as public opinion on this topic is concerned. In this paper our goal 
is to investigate whether the relatively modest investment in social protection programs 
in the US coincides with American public opinion preferences in comparison to other 
highly industrialized democracies. 
There are sharp differences between countries with regard to public opinion on social 
policy and redistribution, and some research suggests that the United States has a 
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distinct position compared to other Western democracies (Alesina & Angeletos 2005; 
Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; Jæger, 2009). Opinions differ, however, on the causal logic 
used to explain these differences. On the one hand, it could be assumed that government 
policy responds to preferences within public opinion. If public opinion is not supportive 
of redistribution efforts, the political system does not receive sufficient incentives to 
develop a strong redistribution scheme (Hicks & Swank, 1992). However, it has also 
been argued that public opinion reacts to the functioning of the system: once a specific 
system has been implemented based on specific historical circumstances, public 
opinion will take this system for granted and internalize its norms and expectations. In 
any case, both assumptions lead to the expectation that there will be a positive 
relationship between government policy and public opinion preferences, regardless of 
the direction of causality. 
To investigate the structure of public opinion beliefs regarding social welfare 
provisions, we rely on the theoretical framework developed by T.H. Marshall (1950). 
The expansion of the welfare state is not only a matter of policy measures, according 
to Marshall, but also reflects an important phase in the expansion of democratic rights. 
In Marshall’s view, prior to the 20th century democratic systems implemented civil and 
political rights, while during the 20th century democracy increasingly came to be 
defined as an expansion of social rights, meaning the right of all citizens to enjoy decent 
living conditions, and the establishment of a social security system that aims to 
guarantee these conditions. A lower level of support among US citizens for social rights 
as part of a comprehensive democratic ideal might therefore be one of the reasons why 
the United States has developed a more restrictive social security system (Garfinkel, 
Rainwater & Smeeding, 2010). This hypothesis will be tested by analyzing recent 
public opinion data on democratic ideals which allow for a direct test of the T.H. 
Marshall theoretical framework. The data also allow for a comparison between the US 
and European societies, so that it can be investigated whether there is a degree of 
American exceptionalism regarding support for social rights. The use of the same 
questions on both sides of the Atlantic allows us to assess to what extent Europeans and 
Americans differ on the importance they attach to the granting of social rights. 
In this paper, we first offer a brief review of the literature, before presenting data and 
methods. Following the results section, we close with some observation on what these 
findings imply for social policy in the United States. 
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Social rights and citizenship 
T.H. Marshall distinguished three different conceptions of citizenship in the historical 
development of modern democracy. Civil citizenship corresponds to the entitlement to 
basic rights, like freedom of speech, thought and faith and the right to own property. 
While some of these rights date back to the Magna Carta (1215), Marshall himself 
considered their proliferation and generalization mainly as an 18th century 
phenomenon. Political citizenship implies the right to vote for office-holders, or to be 
a candidate oneself for elected positions of power. Social citizenship, finally, was 
defined as the right “to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards 
prevailing in the society. The institutions most closely connect with it are the 
educational system and the social services” (Marshall 1964, 72).  
The main innovation in Marshall’s approach was not his sketch of this historical 
development, but rather the fact that he considered these three conceptions of 
citizenship as elements of the same process of broadening fundamental democratic 
rights. From Marshall’s perspective, once citizens are recognized as full members of 
society, they also receive undeniable social rights, such as protection against poverty. 
In other words, social rights have become an integral element of the status of citizenship 
in the 20th century (Marshall 1964, 96). Despite a tendency to give more priority to one 
set of values compared to another (Ariely 2011, 243), it is clear that in Marshall’s view, 
there is no trade-off relation between political and social rights, as both sets of rights 
must be ensured simultaneously (Revi, 2014). As such, Marshall’s writings helped to 
legitimize the historically unprecedented expansion of the social protection function of 
the state, most notably in the United Kingdom. In the normative literature, this 
development is not considered an incremental expansion of the scope of government 
intervention, but rather is viewed as a structural transformation of the way 
contemporary democracy is conceptualized (Cox, 1998). Marshall’s theory of 
citizenship has had a strong impact on normative political science, predominantly due 
to his placement of social rights at the heart of conceptualizing democracy and 
citizenship. While this insight has influenced the normative debate on social policy, the 
distinction between political and social citizenship is rarely used in empirical political 
science (Bulmer & Rees, 1996). Therefore, we do not know whether this theoretical 
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concept actually resonates in public opinion, and, if so, whether it could offer an 
explanation for how citizens envision policy issues of redistribution and social security. 
Marshall’s theory of citizenship relates to contemporaray comprehensive welfare state 
arrangements that became considered a means to ensure the use of full citizenship rights 
(Korpi, 1989). The distinction introduced by Marshall became a mobilizing concept 
that reframed social policy as integral to the realization of citizens’ basic rights and no 
longer as an ideological preference (Connell, 2012). Nevertheless, in the literature, the 
contemporary relevance of Marshall’s ideas has also been challenged. More 
specifically, it is assumed that because of the growing hegemony of economic 
considerations, the identification of citizenship as a purely political category has been 
eroded. Increasingly, the distinction between citizens and consumers is being blurred 
as citizens are considered as consumers of government services. Deckard and Heslin 
(2016) even claim that this process has led to the development of what they label as 
market citizenship. This trend implies that citizens are no longer considered as human 
beings that are invested with rights (Somers, 2008). Citizens are instead considered a 
form of market commodity that no longer carries inalienable rights, but is 
interchangeable on various market-driven exchange mechanisms. If this 
commodification of citizens leads to a form of market citizenship, this would imply that 
the Marshall framework no longer is comprehensive in dealing with the various forms 
of citizenship a society can organize. The triumph of market citizenship could even 
imply that social rights are considered as less relevant, as the distribution of goods and 
services in this case should be governed by market considerations, and not by a 
discourse on basic rights and moral obligations for society and the political system. 
Somers (2008) argues that market citizenship has become an important phenomenon, 
mainly in the United States, where a dominant liberal ethos shapes public policy. If this 
claim is correct, it should be observed that the social rights concept will be less powerful 
in the US than in European countries, where allegedly market citizenship is less 
strongly developed. 
While the theory of T.H. Marshall has been influential in numerous European countries, 
in the United States the impact of his work has remained more limited (Mead, 1997). 
Marshall’s focus on the importance of social rights has also been considered a 
normative choice to support a strong expansion of welfare state provisions, and some 
public opinion research suggests that among the US population support for this kind of 
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expansion is but lukewarm (Quadagno & Pederson, 2012). In the US context, protection 
from poverty and assurance of adequate living condition are much less frequently seen 
as rights that should be guaranteed to all citizens, without distinction, by state 
institutions (Aarøe & Petersen, 2014). The more limited scope of welfare provisions in 
the US in comparison to Europe, thus might imply that US citizens are indeed less likely 
to consider the provision of social goods as a central responsibility for the political 
system. Partly this could be explained by a more liberal economic concept of 
citizenship, where market consideration play a larger role than is the case in European 
societies. 
If there is a convergence between public opinion and public policy, this can be 
explained in two distinct ways. The "regime hypothesis" assumes that public opinion 
adapts itself to the government policy that is being pursued over a longer period of time 
(Jæger, 2006). Generous welfare state arrangements will lead to a generalized feeling 
of entitlement among the population, and therefore these protective measures will be 
taken for granted. Other studies, however, assume that policy is formed in response to 
public opinion. Lipset and Marks (2001) have documented a number of reasons why 
socialism never became a major political force in US politics, including a number of 
strategic mistakes made by both party and trade union officials in the 19th and early 20th 
century. The US founding ethos of individualism and individual responsibility is 
identified by Lipset and Marks as standing in opposition to the collective protection and 
insurance logic that is inherent to the modern welfare state. Following Lipset and 
Marks’s logic leads to the expectation that for US citizens, the protection of social rights 
receives less support in comparison to their European counterparts. The emphasis on 
individual freedom and responsibility that is so central to the American ethos would 
have a negative effect on the public acceptance of collective insurance and 
redistribution schemes. 
In this paper, we do not aim to disentangle the causal relationship between public 
opinion and policy, as we only have access to cross-sectional data. The ambition of this 
paper is therefore more limited, as we aim to determine whether public opinion in the 
US is indeed in congruence with a more restrictive social policy. Our goal is therefore 
to ascertain whether US public opinion with regard to social rights is distinctive in 
comparison to European public opinion. While previous studies have tried to explain 
differences between the US and Europe by investigating conceptions of deservingness, 
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we ascertain to what extent these differences might also be rooted in different concepts 
of ideal democracy (Alesina & Angeletos, 2005).  
More specifically, we test the hypothesis that US citizens’ conception of ideal 
democracy will place less emphasis on social rights in comparison to Europeans. We 
test this hypothesis by comparing findings from the European Social Survey in Europe 
(ESS 2012, 2014) with data from a specific module of the Cooperative Congressional 
Election Study that was conducted in the US in the Fall of 2014 (CCES, 2014). Both 
surveys included an identical list of ideal conceptions of democracy, thus allowing for 
a direct comparison between US and European public opinion. A weaker emphasis on 
social rights in the US, could be one of the elements that help us to explain the US 
exceptionalism with regard to social policy.  
 
Data and methods: Investigating democratic ideals 
The European Social Survey in 2012 is one of the first major comparative surveys in 
which respondents were asked about their expectations on the ideal of democracy. 
Respondents were presented with a variety of aspects of democracy, and were asked to 
indicate the importance of each item (“how important do you think it is for democracy 
in general that…”). The items included in this battery cover diverse aspects of 
democratic functioning ranging from free and fair elections, the protection of minority 
rights to protecting citizens against poverty. The importance of the diversity of these 
items for the purpose of testing our hypothesis is that this battery of items also includes 
social rights, as they were envisioned in the work of T.H. Marshall. 
In the United States, exactly the same module was included as part of the Cooperative 
Congressional Election Study (CCES, 2014) which was conducted just before the 
Congressional elections of November 2014. The sample for this module was precisely 
1,000 respondents. Given our focus on a comparison between the US and its European 
counterparts, in this study we focus mainly on a comparison between the US sample, 
and that of the 29 countries that took part in the European Social Survey. As not all 
these participating countries have a comparable socio-economic status as the US, we 
also make a comparison with a more restrictive sample of the 21 EU member states that 
are represented in the ESS dataset. As both the US and the European data can be 
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considered as largely representative of the population, such a direct comparison is 
empirically warranted.1 The gap in the mean scores in Table 1 between the US and the 
Europe are statistically significant for every indicator, whereas the comparison between 
the two groupings of ESS countries (the full 29-country sample and the 21-country EU 
member sample) are indistinguishable (see appendix Figure A1 for documentation of 
95% confidence intervals). 
[Table 1 about here] 
When we review the mean values of the items in this battery, a first striking finding in 
Table 1 is that respondents tend to consider all elements as very important. With just 
two exceptions (see below) each item receives a score above 7 on a scale from 0 to 10, 
indicating that citizens tend to have quite high expectations on democratic ideals. The 
rule of law (expressed by the item: “The courts treat everyone the same”), is clearly 
considered as the most important hallmark of a democratic political system with a score 
of 9.24 in Europe and 8.71 in the United States. Free and fair elections obtain an almost 
equally high score (8.86 in Europe and 8.55 in the US). Also for the third and the fourth 
most highly ranked items, we can observe a symmetry between Europe and the US. 
Public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic, therefore, seem to converge quite strongly 
on what are the most important characteristics of democracy, and traditional liberal 
elements like the rule of law, free and fair elections and free media clearly are of 
paramount importance for most citizens.  
In contrast to the American and European agreement on the rank order of the four most 
important items, there are major differences in the rank ordering of subsequent items. 
In Europe, protecting citizens against poverty is still considered as an important 
characteristic of a democratic system, with a mean score of 8.73 and ranked as the fifth 
most important item. This is clearly different from the US, where this item ranks 10th, 
with an average score of 6.80. US public opinion, on the other hand, seems to be more 
sensitive to traditional liberal rights, like the capability of the media and opposition 
parties to criticize the government. While reducing income inequality clearly is not a 
high priority for European respondents, this item receives the lowest score for US 
respondents, with an average of 6.26. This simple overview of average scores already 
suggests that the two items that most clearly represent T.H. Marshall’s conception of 
social rights are clearly ranked very low by US respondents, which is not the case for 
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European respondents. Among all the elements of democracy in the survey, the US 
score on the social rights items is the lowest that can be observed. 
In sum, social rights are not considered by European citizens to be outside the realm of 
democratic politics, while we find less support for this claim among US respondents. 
European citizens consider social rights to be highly important for democracy itself, 
while US citizens regard social rights as much less important. The question remains, 
however, whether citizens see a distinction between social and formal political rights 
as inherent to democracy. Here too, we can compare US and European public opinion. 
 
Distinctive democratic ideals: Latent class analysis 
 
In order to assess whether citizens hold distinctive democratic ideals in terms of the 
elements of democracy they consider most important, we conducted a latent class 
analysis (LCA) to identify respondents that are characterized by a similar combination 
of items in this battery. The main advantage of LCA for answering our research 
question is that it allows for the identification of latent structures that are not based on 
the separate items, but rather on how the individuals responding in the survey combine 
those items in a distinctive pattern (Collins & Lanza, 2010). An actor-centered 
technique like LCA is therefore preferable over an item-based technique like factor 
analysis or principal component analysis for our study, as we are mainly interested in 
how individuals make specific combinations of survey items. Latent class analysis 
therefore allows us to identity groups of citizens that adhere to distinctive concepts of 
democracy in terms of how they combine different items in this battery (Magidson & 
Vermunt, 2004). For the purpose of empirically assessing T.H. Marshall’s social and 
political rights concepts, high scores on one set of items (e.g., social rights) are just as 
distinctive for the identification of these groups as low scores on other items (e.g., 
political rights). In contrast to more traditional cluster analysis, LCA allows the 
researcher to determine the optimal number of clusters to be distinguished based on 
objective goodness of fit criteria while in cluster analysis this is usually the result of a 
more arbitrary decision (Nylund et al., 2007).  
 
The eleven items listed in Table 1 are included in the latent class analysis. The goodness 
of fit criteria indicate that the optimal solution distinguishes five groups. These analyses 
are based on data from 30 countries, and from a comparative perspective it is important 
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to determine the validity of our findings across these societies. To assess measurement 
equivalence we conducted tests to ascertain the cross-cultural measurement validity of 
the five constructs (Kankaraš et al. 2010). These tests show that the five group solution 
is indeed present across these societies, and therefore can be seen as a valid 
operationalization. This implies that scores between countries can be compared in a 
valid manner for the interpretation of the distinctive characteristics of the latent classes, 
as well as the subsequent analyses of sociodemographic characteristics of each group 
(see appendix for further documentation of latent class analysis method, including 
analytical code and goodness of fit statistics that inform model selection.  
 
These five groups are depicted in Figure 1, in which the groups are represented in terms 
of the likelihood that they will consider each specific item to be highly important for 
democracy. The democracy indicators are ordered on the x-axis from highest to lowest 
means in the general population, and connective lines are added when useful for 
distinguishing the distinctive characteristics of a latent class. A clear finding in Figure 
1 is that three of these groups consider all items in the survey to be of similar levels of 
importance. The latent class labeled “high ideals”, which includes 24% of the 
respondents, identifies a group of citizens who deemed all of the elements of democracy 
included in the survey to be highly important, without further distinction. This group of 
respondents gives the maximum score to almost all the items, so we can hardly detect 
any variation. Conversely, the group labeled “low ideals”, which includes 10% of the 
respondents, attributed relatively low importance to all the indicators, again without 
any meaningful variation. An additional group labelled “medium ideals” (31% of the 
respondents) consistently attributed moderate importance to all indicators and there is 
no apparent hierarchy in their answers. These findings show that almost two-thirds of 
the respondents (65%) do not attribute special importance to specific elements of 
democracy, but rather consider all to have similar levels of importance. For analytical 
purposes, these groups are potentially problematic, because these uniform scores might 
reflect genuine preferences but we cannot exclude the possibility that these findings 
reflect survey effects such as responses influenced by social desirability, or an effort to 
measure a complex construct for which coherent attitudes may not exist. 
 
The two additional latent classes, labeled "social rights" and "political rights" in Figure 
1 are theoretically more relevant for testing T.H. Marshall’s citizenship theories, as they 
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identify individuals who have contrasting normative conceptions of what is most 
important for democracy. The “social rights” ideal held by 19% of the respondents 
places relatively high importance on democratic values of economic equality (the 
reduction of income inequality and protection from poverty) and governmental 
accountability (government explaining its decisions and held accountable in elections). 
This group of respondents is highly motivated to emphasize social citizenship rights. In 
contrast, the “political rights” ideal that is held by 16% of the respondents places 
relative emphasis on items that correspond to formal political rights in T.H. Marshall’s 
theory, such as the importance of a free and competitive electoral process in which 
parties are free to criticize the government, and free and reliable media. The contrasting 
emphases of these two groups are visually clear in the criss-crossing of the connecting 
lines. The social rights group is highly likely to prioritize reducing poverty and income 
inequality, while this is less of a priority for the political rights group. In contrast, the 
political rights group is highly likely to prioritize free media and freedom of parties to 
oppose and critique the government, which are less of a priority for the “social rights” 
group. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
As already noted, the five group solution for the 30 countries in the analysis was found 
to be characterized by measurement equivalence as necessary for valid cross-group 
comparison of latent constructs, and this includes the US sample. When we present 
findings for the US respondents only, the distinctive features of the US respondents are 
clear (Figure 2). While the contrast between the items emphasized by the political rights 
and the social rights group is already large across the 30-country sample, this contrast 
is even greater among the US sample. The group that supports political rights has an 
exceptionally low level of support for fighting poverty and reducing income inequality. 
American respondents in the political rights group are not merely indifferent about the 
items related to social rights, but rather they attribute these items very low levels of 
importance, particularly in comparison to their European counterparts. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
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The analysis thus far has allowed us to identify five distinct groups of respondents in 
30 countries that adhere to different democratic ideals. The measurement equivalence 
tests show that these latent classes are comparable constructs across countries, meaning 
that we can compare the cross-country distribution of respondents into these groups in 
a valid manner. Marked differences can be observed between countries (Table 2). A 
series of chi-square tests that analyzed the distribution of the US population among the 
five identified latent classes to all other countries in the study show that the distribution 
in the US is indeed significantly different from that of all other countries, and an 
expanded version of this table in the appendix includes standard errors and 95% 
confidence interval for each entry in order to document statistical significance of 
comparisons (appendix Table A3). The findings show that the group that is focused on 
social rights is fairly small in the US, with only 14.76% of respondents (compared to 
19.39% in the pooled data set, a statistically significant difference). This low score, 
however, is by no means exceptional, as countries like the Netherlands or Iceland do 
not differ from the US in a significant manner. The group that emphasizes political 
rights is much larger in the US, including 26.98% of American respondents. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
Characteristics of democratic ideals groups 
Bivariate ideological differences 
A possible critique of the analysis thus far is that the distinction between social and 
political rights largely coincides with partisan differences. Since the group that 
emphasizes social rights expresses an ideological preference for more equality, it seems 
plausible that this group will be synonymous with left-wing ideologies (Miller, 1999).2 
An emphasis on social rights might serve as an expression of left-wing political 
ideology. Table 3 investigates whether this is the case by showing the distribution of 
the democratic ideals identified by LCA among standard left-right ideological 
placement measures. For both left-wing and right-wing respondents, the table shows 
their distribution among the five different democratic ideals. For comparative purposes, 
we have included separate findings for Europe and for the US. For the European 
sample, we also report on the 21 EU countries only, in order to allow for a strict 
comparison to countries with a comparable socio-economic status. The distribution 
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shows that for the European sample, it is incorrect to interpret the social rights group to 
be an expression of a left-leaning ideology. For example, among the respondents who 
identify as right-wing, the proportion that belongs to the social ideals group is strikingly 
similar to the mean of all respondents. This finding indicates that a social rights 
democratic concept that includes reducing poverty and income inequality, is not limited 
to left-leaning respondents in the European population, but is fairly evenly distributed 
across the ideological spectrum. 
This pattern differs strongly in the United States sample. Left-leaning US respondents 
are fairly similar to the overall population in terms of their distribution among the 
different democratic ideals. In addition, there is little difference among the extreme left, 
moderate left and the center in terms of their distribution among the different types of 
democratic ideals. Among moderate right and extreme right-leaning US respondents, 
however, the pattern is starkly different, with very few respondents belonging to the 
social rights group, and almost half of these respondents belonging to the political rights 
group. We can observe, therefore, a marked difference between the US and Europe. 
While in Europe, we find support for social rights across the ideological spectrum, in 
the US this remains mostly limited to those who situate themselves on the left of the 
spectrum. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Characteristics of latent class group members 
The question remains whether these bivariate relationships between the democratic 
ideals groups and left-right self-placement remain valid when accounting for additional 
socio-demographic characteristics. In order to provide a more detailed portrait of the 
classes we identify, we follow standard analytical practice in the literature to conduct 
regression analyses to predict membership in these classes (O'Brien & Noy, 2015; Oser 
2016; Hooghe et al. 2016). As our main theoretical interest is the membership in the 
social and political ideals, Tables 4 and 5 present results of multilevel linear regression 
analyses with the dependent variable of probability of membership in these latent 
classes. These findings determine what kind of individual and country-level 
characteristics help explain whether citizens emphasize a social or political democratic 
ideal.3 
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For individual-level predictors, in addition to the left-right self-placement we also 
include control variables that are commonly used to analyze democratic ideals and 
values (Dalton and Welzel 2014) such as age, education and gender. For country-level 
predictors, we include level of inequality, measured by the Gini index, as calculated 
from income surveys conducted by the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS, 2015) that is 
available for 22 of the countries in the sample. An additional country-level factor is 
democratic stability, as measured by the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al. 2013). Since 
the number of country-level observations is limited, we analyze the country-level 
variables separately (see descriptive statistics in the appendix). 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
The findings provide a more detailed portrait of social and political group members. 
The relationship with left-right self-placement remains significant with additional 
controls, with the social ideal members scoring on the left side of the continuum, and 
the political ideal members scoring on the right. As we would expect from the findings 
above, the relationship is substantively fairly small, which indicates that political and 
social rights ideals do no not fully overlap with respondents’ left-right ideology. There 
is no age distinction for either group, though there is a clear gender effect by which 
women are more likely to hold social rights ideals, while men are more likely to express 
political rights ideals. A difference is also evident for education, with a positive 
relationship evident for the political rights group, whereas the social rights group is 
associated with lower education levels. 
 
At the country level we see the controls are significant in expected directions. 
Democratic stability is measured by number of democratic years, with more mature 
democracies showing a lower prevalence of social ideals but a higher prevalence of 
political ideals. Higher income inequality is associated with a stronger emphasis on 
social rights, whereas lower income inequality is associated with more support for 
political rights. For the US, however, we are confronted with the remarkable 
observation that despite the rather high level of income inequality, this does not seem 
to lead to stronger support for social rights. 
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Conclusion 
In 1883, the German chancellor von Bismarck established the first comprehensive 
system of sickness insurance for workers and this system has been credited with 
providing basic stability for German society. When president Obama tried to follow 
that example some 130 years later, he met with fierce resistance in Congress, and also 
to some extent in public opinion. This comparison raises the question posed by  Lipset 
and Marks (2001): why didn’t it happen here? Why didn’t the United States develop a 
system of universal health care coverage comparable to most other developed 
democracies? In this study, we investigated one potential explanation using public 
opinion data, namely, we ask whether US citizens are more reluctant than their 
European counterparts to consider social rights as an important part of a fully mature 
democratic system. To answer this question, we compared existing data from the 
European Social Survey with a survey that was specifically designed to ask parallel 
questions through the CCES to US respondents. 
 
A first, important finding is that the structure of democratic ideals is comparable across 
societies investigated in this study for the purposes of cross-national comparison. The 
United States clearly is not an exception in this regard, as US respondents still see 
fighting poverty and reducing inequality as an important part of the democratic ideal, 
even though Americans consider these social rights to be less important in comparison 
to Europeans. In other words, American exceptionalism is not strong enough that it 
eliminates the social rights ideal that is so central in the work of T.H. Marshall. The 
distinction between political and social rights as understood by Marshall remains 
meaningful among public opinion for a wide array of contemporary democracies, both 
in Europe as well as in the United States. 
 
What does make the United States exceptional compared with industrialized states in 
Europe, however, is the fact that support for social rights is comparatively limited. On 
a purely descriptive basis, one can already observe that reducing poverty and income 
inequality is attributed relatively low importance in the United States as part of citizens’ 
ideals regarding important elements of democracy. It is noteworthy that the explanation 
for the low level of support for reducing income inequality is likely to be different in 
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the United States than in other countries that also place relatively low importance on 
social rights. In the case of countries like Sweden (Gini coefficient .281), Belgium 
(.268) or Norway (.252) the relatively low support for a further reduction of income 
inequality amounts to a ceiling effect as these countries already have a rather egalitarian 
income structure. As Marshall (1964, 117) noted: “We are not aiming at absolute 
equality. There are limits inherent in the egalitarian movement.” But among the 24 
traditional OECD member states, the United States in fact has the highest level of 
income inequality with a Gini coefficient of .396, followed by Estonia with .361. This 
is an exceptionally high figure, and it seems plausible that this unusually high level of 
inequality could serve as an incentive to place more emphasis on fighting income 
inequality. The data show, however, that exactly the opposite occurs, and that support 
for social rights remains rather limited in US public opinion. It has been argued that US 
public opinion generally favors allowing market forces to influence how citizenship 
rights can be exercised, and our results concur with this argument, despite the 
exceptionally high level of inequality. 
 
The findings in this study show that the low level of average support for social rights 
in the United States is manifested in two ways. First, the latent class that emphasizes 
social rights includes a comparatively small proportion of the population in the US 
context, relative to comparable countries in Europe. Just as important is the fact that 
when the US is analyzed separately, among the group that emphasizes political rights 
the scores for the “social” items are extremely low. This means that for the American 
citizens who place a special emphasis on political rights, social rights play a negligible 
role in terms of their vision of important components of democracy. This is in line with 
the literature on market citizenship, which stresses that in highly competitive market 
economies, the attribution of full citizenship is largely left to the functioning of market 
forces. Whether or not this form of market citizenship indeed pushes out the social 
concept of citizenship rights, however, is a topic that requires further research. 
 
The current study offers a first step in the explanation of why the United States is such 
a distinct society when it comes to social security and income redistribution. What we 
can observe is that in the US these policies are congruent with public opinion 
preferences that prioritize the importance of classic political rights over social rights. It 
is obvious that in the United States in 2014, support for social rights can be identified 
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among public opinion, but support is significantly weaker than in Europe. Due to the 
cross-sectional nature of the data analyzed in the current study, we cannot determine 
the causal mechanisms that leads to this congruence. The regime hypothesis would 
argue that US citizens have learned over time not to expect strong government 
intervention on these issues. Why this is the case could be a matter of historical 
investigations on factors such as presidential power, the absence of a socialist party, or 
the weakness of trade unions (Lipset & Marks, 2001). Other authors would argue that 
the US political system receives less pressure from public opinion to extend social 
rights, as this kind of social protest would run against the US ethos that promotes 
individual freedom and opportunity. This kind of preference is more strongly associated 
with forms of market citizenship. The current study's findings of distinct patterns in US 
public opinion on these matters renders it promising to gather the requisite longitudinal 
data in future studies in order to investigate whether there is a causal relation between 
both phenomena. 
 
The findings of the current study show, however, that an emphasis on social rights is 
present not only among the far left in the US, but is shared fairly equally among the 
moderate left and centrists as well. While protests such as “Occupy” seemed to draw 
upon the far left in particular, it would seem that the surprising success of the populist 
economic messages during the 2016 presidential campaign, voiced in different ways in 
the campaigns of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump, also drew upon the moderate left 
and centrist voters who align with their European counterparts in their emphasis of the 
importance of social rights (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016). No matter what the exact 
causal mechanism could be, the congruence between policy and public opinion 
preference allows us to predict that politicians who want to expand the scope of the 
state system in the U.S. will face an uphill battle. While previous research has focused 
mainly on institutional elements in order to explain American exceptionalism on these 
matters (Teles, 1998), our findings suggest that further research on public opinion can 
also play an important role in understanding this puzzle.  
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Table 1. Mean scores on “democratic ideals” battery 
 
Description Abbreviation Eur. mean EU mean US mean US order 
1. The courts treat everyone the same courts fair 9.24 9.33 8.71  1 
2. The government explains its decisions to voters govt expl. 8.88 9.01 8.27  3 
3. National elections are free and fair fair elec. 8.86 8.95 8.55  2 
4. The media provide citizens with reliable information to 
judge the government 
media info. 8.75 8.77 8.24  4 
5. The government protects all citizens against poverty poverty  8.73 8.76 6.80 10 
6. Governing parties are punished in elections when they 
have done a bad job 
party acc. 8.48 8.57 7.74   5 
7. The rights of minority groups are protected minority 8.27 8.53 7.40   9 
8. The government takes measures to reduce differences in 
income levels 
income eq. 8.26 8.27 6.26 11 
9. Opposition parties are free to criticise the government opposition 8.22 8.19 7.58   7 
10. The media are free to criticise the government free media 8.09 8.07 7.62   6 
11. Different political parties offer clear alternatives to one 
another 
party alter. 7.97 7.95 7.55   8 
Notes: European Social Survey, 29 countries (n=48,805); ESS 2012, 21 European Union (EU) 
countries only, (n=37,156); CCES, 2014 for the US (n=944). Appropriate weights applied; for ESS, 
design weight (dweight) and population size weight (pweight); for CCES, design weight (weight). 
Prefatory survey question: “Using this card, please tell me how important you think it is for democracy 
in general that…”. Responses coded on a 0 to 10 scale where 0 indicates “not at all important” and 10 
indicates “extremely important”.  Indicators are listed in descending order of means in Europe; right-
hand column lists the rank ordering for the US data. 
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Table 2. Democratic ideals: distribution of citizens in Europe and the US 
  Social  Political High Medium Low n 
Albania 33.33  6.87 46.02 12.90 0.88  1,201 
Belgium 18.42  15.52 12.51 40.39 13.16  1,869 
Bulgaria 21.15  18.76 39.50 16.90 3.70  2,260 
Switzerland 19.41  21.39 12.60 39.65 6.95  1,493 
Cyprus 18.89  11.64 41.09 26.18 2.18  1,116 
Czech Republic 17.69  17.63 17.46 30.46 16.76  2,009 
Germany 18.54  31.88 15.93 29.10 4.54  2,958 
Denmark 15.93  31.00 16.48 33.88 2.70  1,650 
Estonia 17.39  14.62 27.54 28.99 11.47  2,380 
Spain 29.02  6.52 32.02 25.94 6.49  1,889 
Finland 18.92  16.16 11.52 43.07 10.33  2,197 
France 19.56  13.51 17.07 39.48 10.38  1,968 
United Kingdom 19.12  12.19 19.26 36.01 13.42  2,286 
Hungary 15.97  11.55 37.92 21.47 13.10  2,014 
Ireland 15.93  11.84 21.79 34.00 16.44  2,628 
Israel 20.03  15.77 23.69 34.41 6.10  2,508 
Iceland 15.33  27.53 23.89 28.56 4.69  752 
Italy 28.75  10.81 26.23 29.91 4.30  960 
Lithuania 16.52  11.99 22.88 30.26 18.35  2,109 
Netherlands 12.34  19.38 9.25 44.72 14.31  1,845 
Norway 17.72  26.39 17.29 34.63 3.97  1,624 
Poland 27.06  16.48 27.16 25.62 3.69  1,898 
Portugal 18.03  4.47 29.28 25.51 22.71  2,151 
Russia 21.03  12.39 26.35 24.03 16.19  2,484 
Sweden 13.50  31.09 24.59 27.27 3.55  1,847 
Slovenia 32.93  10.59 21.27 29.91 5.30  1,257 
Slovakia 13.76  12.52 15.90 38.14 19.68  1,847 
Ukraine 22.40  10.80 31.98 27.52 7.30  2,178 
Kosovo 20.94  7.11 41.03 22.04 8.88  1,295 
United States 14.76  26.98 11.94 24.97 21.34  1,000 
TOTAL 19.39 16.11 23.64 30.54 10.24 55,673 
Source: ESS 2012 merged with CCES, 2014 (n=55,115). Missing data on the democratic ideals battery 
constitutes only 0.2% of US respondents (n=2) and 1% of European cases (n=556). 
Notes: Entries are latent class analysis findings for distribution of population in each country among 
the five latent classes, with weights applied. Note that each row totals 100% of the country’s 
population. 
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Table 3. Left-right position and democratic ideals typology  
29 European countries – all countries in the ESS 2012 
 
Social 
Ideals 
Political 
Ideals 
High 
Ideals 
Medium 
Ideals 
Low 
Ideals N 
All respondents 19.27  17.13 22.59 31.08 9.94  46,457 
Extreme left 21.82  13.93 33.79 24.71 5.76  5,588 
Moderate left 18.06  19.11 21.88 30.57 10.38  8,213 
Center 20.67  14.23 22.21 30.95 11.94  15,400 
Moderate right 16.67  20.39 16.33 34.85 11.76  9,265 
Extreme right 19.12  19.02 23.73 31.73 6.40  7,991 
    
21 European Union countries in the ESS 2012  
 
Social 
Ideals 
Political 
Ideals 
High 
Ideals 
Medium 
Ideals 
Low 
Ideals N 
All respondents 18.78  17.23 21.63 31.72 10.64  35,510 
Extreme left 21.58  14.30 33.17 24.61 6.34  4,437 
Moderate left 17.94  18.82 22.35 30.54 10.35  6,592 
Center 20.78  14.23 21.13 31.25 12.61  11,983 
Moderate right 15.69  20.13 15.64 36.12 12.42  7,129 
Extreme right 17.32  20.31 20.77 33.91 7.68  5,369 
    
United States only  
 
Social 
Ideals 
Political 
Ideals 
High 
Ideals 
Medium 
Ideals 
Low 
Ideals N 
All respondents 15.38  27.94 12.03 25.71 18.93  901 
Extreme left 12.88  23.20 27.42 25.26 11.23  84 
Moderate left 17.86  21.66 18.73 23.39 18.37  199 
Center 19.47  22.09 10.21 30.41 17.82  305 
Moderate right 13.43  35.37 7.83 21.96 21.42  209 
Extreme right 3.14  43.46 6.16 24.56 22.68  104 
Source: ESS 2012 and CCES, 2014. Sample sizes for each table reflect missing data for left-right 
placement variable of 14.43% for the merged sample (9.9% for the US only). A left-right placement 
scale question is included in both surveys; for the ESS the scale ranges from 0 to 10, whereas the 
CCES scale ranges from 1 to 5. The ESS scale was recoded to a 5-point measure to harmonize with the 
CCES scale. 
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Table 4. Characteristics of social ideals groups in 30 countries 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Gender 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 
(1=female) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
    
Age 0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education (ref=low)    
   Medium -0.014*** -0.011** -0.012** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
    
   High -0.060*** -0.057*** -0.065*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
    
Left-right  -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (1= far left, 5=far right) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Country level variables    
Democracy in years  -0.001*  
  (0.000)  
    
Gini coefficient   0.436* 
   (0.198) 
    
Constant 0.207*** 0.232*** 0.059 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.059) 
Observations 46971 46272 37392 
Source: ESS 2012 and CCES, 2014. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5. Characteristics of political ideals group members in 30 countries 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Gender -0.060*** -0.053*** -0.062*** 
(1=female) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
    
Age -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Education (ref=low) 0.053*** 0.064*** 0.074*** 
   Medium (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
    
   High 0.173*** 0.172*** 0.192*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
    
Left-right  0.011*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 
 (1= far left, 5=far 
right) 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
    
Country level variables   
Democracy in years  0.001***  
  (0.000)  
    
Gini coefficient   -0.699* 
   (0.335) 
    
Constant 0.124*** 0.049* 0.334*** 
 (0.006) (0.021) (0.100) 
Observations 46971 46272 37392 
Source: ESS 2012 and CCES, 2014. Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Figure 1. Democratic ideals held by five latent groups of citizens in 30 countries 
 
  
Notes: European Social Survey, 2012 (n=54,673) merged with CCES, 2014 (n= 1,000). The x-axis 
indicators are organized from left to right by decreasing means in the pooled dataset. The y-axis plots 
the conditional probabilities that members of a latent class will consider the democracy indicators to be 
important for democracy, with connective lines to aid interpretation of complex democratic ideals. The 
y-axis scale is based on 3-point coding of the original 11-category items conducted to address issues of 
sparse data in analyzing categorical variables (Agresti, 2008). See appendix for further documentation 
of latent class analysis analytics, including model selection, measurement equivalence tests and 
robustness tests. 
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Figure 2. Democratic ideals – US only 
 
Source: CCES, 2014 (n=1,000). For methods: see Figure 1. 
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Appendix 
 
A1. Democratic ideal mean scores 
 
Figure A1. Democratic ideal mean scores including confidence intervals 
 
Notes: See Table 1 in manuscript for sources and methodology. Average scores for resp. 29 ESS 
countries, 21 EU countries, and the United States. Whisker plots represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
A2. Latent class analysis and model selection 
The latent class analysis is conducted using Latent Gold software. Table A1 displays 
the goodness of fit statistics for selecting the optimal number of latent classes, and for 
testing for measurement equivalence across countries. The BIC is the most widely used 
statistic for assessing goodness of fit, and a smaller BIC indicates better model fit. A 
complementary approach is to evaluate the percent change in the likelihood chi-squared 
statistic L² in comparison to the one-class model (Magidson & Vermunt 2004: 176-
177). Even though the absolute value of the BIC continues to decrease through the 6-
class model, the percent reduction of the L² is minimal in the 6-class model. Based on 
these considerations, we selected the five-class model. 
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Table A1. LCA model fit statistics        
Number classes BIC(LL) CAIC(LL) L² Change L² Class.Err. 
1-Class 1194720 1194742 414310   0.00 
2-Class 1020489 1020523 239949 -0.42 0.04 
3-Class 973207 973253 192535 -0.54 0.06 
4-Class 955536 955594 174733 -0.58 0.08 
5-Class 936685 936755 155751 -0.62 0.10 
6-Class 929586 929668 148521 -0.64 0.12 
                 
Notes: European Social Survey, 2012 (n=54,673) merged with CCES, 2014 (n=1,000). BIC = Bayesian 
Information Criterion; LL = log likelihood; L²=likelihood ratio chi-square statistics. Entries are test 
statistics for latent class models identifying one and more clusters of respondents, based on 11 
indicators of democratic ideals with “country” as a covariate, missings imputed, and design weights 
applied. Optimal model highlighted in bold. 
 
 
A3. Latent class measurement equivalence tests 
 
It is important to test whether the latent classes identified in the optimal model are 
equivalent across the countries in the data (Kankaraš, Moors & Vermunt, 2010; 
Kankaraš & Vermunt, 2014). Table A2 includes the fit statistics of tests for two kinds 
of measurement equivalence:  
(1) Partial equivalence means that the same latent construct (i.e., the five 
democratic ideals identified by the latent class analysis) is valid across all of 
the groups under investigation (i.e., 30 countries). 
(2) Homogeneous equivalence means that the scales of the latent construct 
have the same origin, in addition to the same slope parameters (as indicated 
in partial equivalence). 
The equivalence tests in Table A2 show that the partial equivalence model has the 
lowest BIC and is the optimal model. The subsequent models remove direct effects for 
single indicators to test whether full equivalence is found for specific indicators, testing 
first for indicators with the lowest bivariate residuals. The increased BIC in the models 
that selectively remove direct effects for single indicators shows that no indicators are 
fully homogeneous across countries, and therefore the partial equivalence model with 
direct effects is the optimal model.  
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Table A2. Latent class analysis measurement equivalence tests 
Models BIC(LL) CAIC(LL) L² Change L² Class.Err. 
Homogeneous model 929450 929632 326900   0.10 
Heterogeneous model 917778 919808 295067 -0.10 0.10 
Partial equivalence, all 
direct effects 913246 914044 303976 -0.07 0.11 
Partial equivalence, 1 direct 
effect removed (meprinf) 913905 914647 305245 -0.07 0.10 
Partial equivalence,  1 direct 
effect removed (oppcrgv) 913885 914627 305225 -0.07 0.10 
Notes: European Social Survey, 2012 (n=54,673) merged with CCES, 2014 (n=1,000). BIC = Bayesian 
Information Criterion; LL = log likelihood; L²=likelihood ratio chi-square statistics. Entries are test 
statistics for latent class measurement equivalence tests across countries for the 5-class model, based on 
11 indicators with “country” as a covariate, missings imputed, and design weights applied. Optimal 
model highlighted in bold font. 
 
 
A4. Robustness tests 
 
Missing data: The reported findings include all cases in the data, including those with 
missing data on the questions regarding democratic ideals. We conducted two alternate 
analyses to ascertain the effect of missing data: (a) A listwise deletion of all cases that 
are missing data on any of the 11 democracy indicators (b) Retaining cases that have 
missing data on only one indicator in the battery, thereby analyzing 94.61% of the 
research population. Analyses based on these alternate codings of missing data yielded 
the same substantive findings. 
 
Indicator coding: The advantage of recoding the original 11-category items into 
more parsimonious categories for the latent class analysis is to avoid the problem of 
sparse data in analyzing categorical variables (Agresti 2007). The variables in this 
battery are skewed toward the high end of the 11-point scale, so use of the original 
11-category items creates a problem of sparse data. The 3-point recode conducted to 
produce the findings reported in this article recode 0-7 to 1; 8-9 to 2; and 10 to 3. We 
also performed robustness tests to investigate whether the findings were affected by 
alternate codings, including: the original 11-cateory response items; dichotomous 
cutoffs at 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, as well as the mean or median of each variable; an alternate 3-
point coding (0-8=1, 9=2, 10=3) and a 4-point coding (0-7=1, 8=2, 9=3, 10=4). These 
tests all yielded similar substantive results as those reported in the article. 
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A5. Cross-national distribution of LCA groups, including confident intervals 
 
Table A3. Democratic ideals, distribution of citizens including Standard Errors and 
Confidence Intervals (addendum to Table 2 in the manuscript). [for online-appendix] 
 
  Proportion Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Social   
 AL 33.33 1.92 29.69 37.19 
 BE 18.42 0.90 16.72 20.25 
 BG 21.15 0.95 19.35 23.07 
 CH 19.41 1.03 17.47 21.52 
 CY 18.89 1.28 16.51 21.54 
 CZ 17.69 0.95 15.91 19.62 
 DE 18.54 0.74 17.13 20.03 
 DK 15.93 0.91 14.23 17.79 
 EE 17.39 0.78 15.91 18.98 
 ES 29.02 1.06 26.99 31.13 
 FI 18.92 0.84 17.33 20.62 
 FR 19.56 1.02 17.64 21.64 
 GB 19.12 0.93 17.37 21.01 
 HU 15.97 0.83 14.42 17.66 
 IE 15.93 0.81 14.41 17.59 
 IL 20.03 0.82 18.48 21.68 
 IS 15.33 1.37 12.84 18.21 
 IT 28.75 1.47 25.97 31.71 
 LT 16.52 0.91 14.81 18.38 
 NL 12.34 0.85 10.76 14.11 
 NO 17.72 0.95 15.93 19.66 
 PL 27.06 1.04 25.07 29.13 
 PT 18.03 0.98 16.19 20.02 
 RU 21.03 0.95 19.22 22.96 
 SE 13.50 0.80 12.01 15.14 
 SI 32.93 1.34 30.35 35.61 
 SK 13.76 1.05 11.84 15.95 
 UA 22.40 0.99 20.52 24.40 
 XK 20.94 1.44 18.26 23.91 
 US 14.76 1.66 11.80 18.33 
 TOTAL 19.32 0.18 18.97 19.68  
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Table A3 (continued) 
  Proportion Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Political   
 AL 6.87 1.02 5.12 9.16 
 BE 15.52 0.84 13.95 17.24 
 BG 18.76 0.90 17.06 20.58 
 CH 21.39 1.07 19.37 23.56 
 CY 11.64 1.01 9.80 13.78 
 CZ 17.63 0.98 15.79 19.64 
 DE 31.88 0.91 30.12 33.70 
 DK 31.00 1.14 28.81 33.29 
 EE 14.62 0.73 13.25 16.11 
 ES 6.52 0.57 5.49 7.73 
 FI 16.16 0.79 14.67 17.77 
 FR 13.51 0.85 11.92 15.26 
 GB 12.19 0.77 10.76 13.77 
 HU 11.55 0.72 10.21 13.03 
 IE 11.84 0.69 10.55 13.27 
 IL 15.77 0.75 14.36 17.28 
 IS 27.53 1.64 24.44 30.86 
 IT 10.81 1.01 8.99 12.94 
 LT 11.99 0.85 10.42 13.77 
 NL 19.38 1.01 17.47 21.44 
 NO 26.39 1.10 24.30 28.60 
 PL 16.48 0.86 14.87 18.23 
 PT 4.47 0.57 3.48 5.73 
 RU 12.39 0.76 10.97 13.96 
 SE 31.09 1.08 29.01 33.25 
 SI 10.59 0.88 8.99 12.44 
 SK 12.52 1.13 10.47 14.92 
 UA 10.80 0.77 9.37 12.41 
 XK 7.11 0.89 5.55 9.07 
 US 26.98 1.81 23.59 30.66 
 TOTAL 16.01 0.17 15.68 16.34  
  
34 
 
Table A3 (continued) 
 
High   
 AL 46.02 2.03 42.08 50.01 
 BE 12.51 0.77 11.09 14.10 
 BG 39.50 1.12 37.34 41.71 
 CH 12.60 0.87 11.00 14.40 
 CY 41.09 1.62 37.96 44.30 
 CZ 17.46 0.95 15.69 19.39 
 DE 15.93 0.70 14.62 17.35 
 DK 16.48 0.92 14.76 18.36 
 EE 27.54 0.92 25.77 29.38 
 ES 32.02 1.09 29.93 34.19 
 FI 11.52 0.68 10.25 12.93 
 FR 17.07 0.95 15.29 19.02 
 GB 19.26 0.95 17.47 21.18 
 HU 37.92 1.09 35.80 40.08 
 IE 21.79 0.90 20.08 23.60 
 IL 23.69 0.87 22.02 25.43 
 IS 23.89 1.58 20.93 27.12 
 IT 26.23 1.42 23.54 29.12 
 LT 22.88 1.08 20.83 25.06 
 NL 9.25 0.72 7.93 10.76 
 NO 17.29 0.94 15.52 19.21 
 PL 27.16 1.04 25.18 29.24 
 PT 29.28 1.14 27.09 31.57 
 RU 26.35 1.02 24.40 28.41 
 SE 24.59 1.01 22.67 26.62 
 SI 21.27 1.17 19.07 23.65 
 SK 15.90 1.16 13.76 18.30 
 UA 31.98 1.12 29.84 34.21 
 XK 41.03 1.74 37.66 44.47 
 US 11.94 1.29 9.63 14.72 
 TOTAL 23.75 0.20 23.37 24.14  
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Table A3 (continued) 
Medium   
 AL 12.90 1.29 10.57 15.64 
 BE 40.39 1.14 38.18 42.63 
 BG 16.90 0.85 15.30 18.62 
 CH 39.65 1.28 37.17 42.17 
 CY 26.18 1.46 23.43 29.14 
 CZ 30.46 1.17 28.21 32.80 
 DE 29.10 0.88 27.41 30.86 
 DK 33.88 1.17 31.63 36.22 
 EE 28.99 0.94 27.18 30.86 
 ES 25.94 1.02 23.99 27.99 
 FI 43.07 1.06 41.00 45.16 
 FR 39.48 1.25 37.06 41.95 
 GB 36.01 1.15 33.79 38.30 
 HU 21.47 0.92 19.71 23.33 
 IE 34.00 1.03 32.02 36.04 
 IL 34.41 0.97 32.53 36.33 
 IS 28.56 1.67 25.40 31.94 
 IT 29.91 1.48 27.08 32.89 
 LT 30.26 1.15 28.06 32.55 
 NL 44.72 1.27 42.24 47.23 
 NO 34.63 1.18 32.35 36.99 
 PL 25.62 1.02 23.67 27.66 
 PT 25.51 1.12 23.38 27.77 
 RU 24.03 1.00 22.13 26.04 
 SE 27.27 1.04 25.28 29.36 
 SI 29.91 1.31 27.41 32.53 
 SK 38.14 1.60 35.06 41.32 
 UA 27.52 1.06 25.50 29.64 
 XK 22.04 1.47 19.30 25.05 
 US 24.97 1.84 21.53 28.75 
 TOTAL 30.77 0.21 30.35 31.19  
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Table A3 (continued) 
 
Low   
 AL 0.88 0.28 0.48 1.63 
 BE 13.16 0.78 11.70 14.77 
 BG 3.70 0.44 2.93 4.66 
 CH 6.95 0.66 5.75 8.37 
 CY 2.18 0.46 1.45 3.29 
 CZ 16.76 0.94 15.00 18.68 
 DE 4.54 0.40 3.82 5.40 
 DK 2.70 0.40 2.01 3.60 
 EE 11.47 0.66 10.24 12.82 
 ES 6.49 0.57 5.46 7.71 
 FI 10.33 0.65 9.12 11.68 
 FR 10.38 0.81 8.90 12.07 
 GB 13.42 0.82 11.89 15.12 
 HU 13.10 0.76 11.68 14.66 
 IE 16.44 0.80 14.92 18.07 
 IL 6.10 0.49 5.22 7.13 
 IS 4.69 0.82 3.33 6.57 
 IT 4.30 0.66 3.18 5.79 
 LT 18.35 1.00 16.48 20.40 
 NL 14.31 0.91 12.62 16.19 
 NO 3.97 0.49 3.12 5.03 
 PL 3.69 0.44 2.91 4.65 
 PT 22.71 1.05 20.73 24.82 
 RU 16.19 0.87 14.56 17.97 
 SE 3.55 0.43 2.79 4.50 
 SI 5.30 0.64 4.18 6.70 
 SK 19.68 1.21 17.41 22.16 
 UA 7.30 0.61 6.19 8.59 
 XK 8.88 1.00 7.10 11.05 
 US 21.34 1.98 17.73 25.47 
 TOTAL 10.15 0.14 9.87 10.43  
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A6. Descriptive statistics and code for select analyses 
 
Table A4. Descriptive statistics for multilevel regression analysis 
 
Variables  N Mean SD  Min Max  
Individual level 
variables           
Political ideals 55,673 0.163 0.320 0 1 
Social ideals 55,673 0.198 0.348 0 1 
Gender (female = 1) 55,656 0.544 0.498 0 1 
Age 55,540 48.351 18.562 15 103 
Education 55,309 1.791 0.771 1 3 
Left-right ideology 47,358 3.125 1.234 1 5 
Country-level variables           
Democracy years 54,921 48.790 34.060 0 94 
Gini coefficient 42,106 0.295 0.041 0.237 0.379 
 
Latent class analysis code for main reported model (Latent Gold 4.5 software) 
model 
options 
   algorithm  
      tolerance=1e-008 emtolerance=0.01 emiterations=250 nriterations=50; 
   startvalues 
      seed=0 sets=10 tolerance=1e-005 iterations=50; 
   bayes 
      categorical=1 variances=1 latent=1 poisson=1; 
   montecarlo 
      seed=0 replicates=500 tolerance=1e-008; 
   quadrature  nodes=10; 
   missing  includeall; 
   output       
      parameters=effect standarderrors probmeans=posterior profile bivariateresiduals; 
   outfile  'C:\ \ESSUS_LCAoutput.sav' 
      id=cntry_idno 
 classification; 
variables 
   samplingweight dweight rescale; 
   dependent cttresa_3gg, fairelc_3gg, gvexpdc_3gg, meprinf_3gg, gvctzpv_3gg, 
      gptpelc_3gg, rghmgpr_3gg, oppcrgv_3gg, medcrgv_3gg, grdfinc_3gg, dfprtal_3gg; 
   independent cntry nominal; 
   latent 
      Cluster nominal 5; 
equations 
     Cluster <- 1 + cntry; 
   cttresa_3gg <- 1|cntry  + Cluster ; 
   fairelc_3gg <- 1|cntry  + Cluster ; 
   gvexpdc_3gg <- 1|cntry  + Cluster ; 
   meprinf_3gg <- 1|cntry  + Cluster ; 
   gvctzpv_3gg <- 1|cntry  + Cluster ; 
   gptpelc_3gg <- 1|cntry  + Cluster ; 
   rghmgpr_3gg <- 1|cntry  + Cluster ; 
   oppcrgv_3gg <- 1|cntry  + Cluster ; 
   medcrgv_3gg <- 1|cntry  + Cluster ; 
   grdfinc_3gg <- 1|cntry  + Cluster ; 
   dfprtal_3gg <- 1|cntry  + Cluster ; 
end model 
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Endnotes 
 
1.  The eight countries that are surveyed in the ESS 2012 but are not members of the 
EU include Albania, Israel, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Ukraine and 
Kosovo. 
2. In order to make a comparison between countries possible, we do not use national 
party identities, but a left-right self-placement scale that is used in all 30 countries. In 
the US sample, those that identify with the Democratic Party, on average score 2.38 on 
this scale, while the identifiers with the Republican Party obtain an average score of 
4.05. 
3. We also conducted parallel models of multinomial logistic regression analyses with 
the dependent variable of modal membership in one of the 5 latent classes. The results 
concur substantively with the findings presented in Tables 4 and 5, and we opt to 
present these findings in the manuscript as they focus on the main theoretical 
relationships of interest in a way that is more readily interpretable in comparison to the 
multinomial regression findings. 
                                                            
